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Abstract 
Within diagnostic reasoning there have been a numb�r 
of proposed definitions of a diagnosis, and of an opti­
mal or most likely diagnosis. These include most prob­
able posterior hypothesis, most probable interpretation, 
most probable covering hypothesis, etc. Most of these 
approaches assume that the most likely diagnosis must 
be computed, and that a definition of what should be 
computed can be made a priori, independent
. 
of wh�t 
the diagnosis is used for. We argue that the dtagnosttc 
problem, as currently pos.ed! is incomplete: it does .�ot consider how the diagnosiS IS to be used, or the utility 
associated with the treatment of the abnormalities. In 
this paper we analyse several well-known .d.efinitions �f diagnosis, showing that the different defimt10�s of opti­
mal diagnosis have different qualitative meamngs, even 
given the same input data. We argue that the most ap­
propriate definition of (optimal) diagnosis needs to �ake 
into account the utility of outcomes and what the diag­
nosis is used for. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Within diagnostic reasoning there have been a number 
of proposals of what constitutes a. diagnosis, an� so pre; sumably, what constitutes an optimal or mo�t likely di­
agnosis. These include most probable posterior h�poth­
esis [Pearl 1986], most probable interpretation lPearl, 
1987], most probable provable hypothesis [Reiter, 1987, 
de Kleer and Williams, 1987, de Kleer et al., 1990], 
most probable covering hypothesis [Reggia et al., 1985, 
Peng and Reggia, 1987a, Peng and Reggia.' 1987b]. Un­like earlier logic-based diagnoses that consider what can 
be proven about a faulty device [Genes�reth, 1984�, th�e 
papers have considered that the quest10� ��at i.s a di­agnosis?" is important to answer. The mt�itlOn IS �h�t 
it is important to characterise the set of "logical possibil­
ities" for a diagnosis, presumably to be able to compare 
them. Most of these approaches assume that the most 
likely diagnosis must be computed, and that a definition 
of the what should be computed can be made a priori, 
independently of what the diagnosis is used for. 
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Once the sets of hypotheses considered as diagnoses 
are determined one of the ways we may want to compare 
competing diagnoses to give us the most likely diagnosis 
is by using probability [de Kleer and Williams, 1987, 
Neufeld and Poole, 1987, de Kleer and Williams, 1989, 
Pearl, 1987]. In computing the probability of A given B, 
p(AIB), Bayesian analysis tells us that the B should be 
all of the available evidence [Kyburg, 1988, Pearl, 1988], 
but does not give us any hints as to what A should be. 
This paper asks the question of what combination of 
hypotheses A should be in order to be most usef�l. 
In this paper we study six approaches to dia�nos­
tic reasoning, and their associated notions of opt�al­
ity based on probability theory (or another uncertamty 
calculus). Each approach considers a conjunction ?f hy­
potheses as a most likely diagnosis. We call the slX ap­
proaches: 
1. most likely single-fault hypothesis; 
2. most likely posterior hypothesis; 
3. most likely interpretation; 
4. probability of provability; 
5. covering explanations; and 
6. utility-based explanation. 
We contrast the first five approaches to diagnostic rea­
soning with a classic utility-based approach to diagnostic 
reasoning [Ledley and Lusted, 1959]. . 
In analysing these proposals, we show that the differ­
ent definitions of optimal diagnosis have different qual­
itative (and quantitative) results, even given �he sa�e 
input data. Moreover, we argue that the diagnostic 
problem, as currently posed, is incomplete: it does .�ot consider how the diagnosis is to be used, or the utility 
associated with either the diagnosis or the treatment of 
the abnormalities. We argue that the most appropri­
ate definition of (optimal) diagnosis should be based on 
what the diagnosis is used for. The point of this paper is 
to question current approaches to formalising diagnos­
tic reasoning, and hopefully focus attention on crucial 
questions not being studied. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 introduces the notation and discusses what 
the diagnostic problem should entail. Section 3 formally 
defines the six approaches to diagnosis studied in this 
paper. Section 4 shows examples of how the diagnoses 
produced by the different approaches are qualitatively 
different. Section 5 discusses the proposals, evaluating 
their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, Section 6 draws 
a few conclusions. 
2 WHAT IS THE DIAGNOSTIC 
PROBLEM? 
2.1 Notation 
We call E the knowledge used to compute a diagnosis. 
E can be broken down into a set F of facts which are 
unchanging from instance to instance (e.g. F can be a 
model of a circuit which is being diagnosed), and a set 
0 of observations concerning a particular instance. We 
call H = { h1, ... , hm} the set of hypotheses under con­
sideration given E. T = {t1, ... , tl} is the set of possible 
treatments. 
This diagnostic problem can be formalised in either 
probabilistic or logical terminology. In terms of logi­
cal terminology, we use the Theorist framework of hy­
pothetical reasoning [Poole et al., 1987, Poole, 1987], a 
formalism well suited to the task as the paradigms can 
be naturally represented in the simple formal framework. 
Theorist [Poole, 1987] is defined as follows. The user pro­
vides F, a set of closed formulae (called the facts) and 
H, a set of open formulae (called the possible hypothe­
ses). A scenario is a set DUF where D is a conjunction 
of hypotheses D = 1\i hi for some i = 1, ... , m, such that 
D U F is consistent. An explanation of formula g is a 
scenario that logically implies g. An extension is the 
set of logical consequences of a maximal (with respect to 
set inclusion) scenario. 
For a given treatment r s;;; T, we define a utility 
function u(E, D, r) . Using a standard decision-theoretic 
approach (e.g. [Berger, 1985]), the goal of diagnostic 
reasoning can be defined as choosing r to maximise 
u(E, D, r) . If there are probability distributions de­
fined over E and D, then the maximum expected utility, 
&[u(E, D, r)], is required. For example, if for diagno­
sis i, i = 1, ... ,k, the utility associated with treating 
diagnosis Di is u(E, Di, r) = ai, and diagnosis Di oc­
curs with probability p(Di), the goal is to choose r to 
maximise Ei(ai · p(Di)). In computing expected utility 
values, influence diagrams [Howard and Matheson, 1981, 
Shachter, 1986] can be used to find the treatment with 
highest utility. 
2.2 Diagnostic Problem 
A complete diagnostic cycle consists of reasoning from 
evidence E to hypothesised diagnosis H, and then ad­
ministering a treatment T for the diagnosis (or abnor­
malities). This is shown in Figure 1. 
In most current formal theories of diagnosis (e.g. 
[Reiter, 1987, Peng and Reggia, 1987a, de Kleer and 
Williams, 1987, Pearl, 1987, Pople, 1982]), the treat­
ment phase is not considered at all, and diagnoses are 
defined with respect to the evidence-hypothesis phase 
only. These approaches ignore utility considerations to­
tally. It is interesting to note that in one of the earli­
est analyses of medical diagnostic reasoning, Ledley and 
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Figure 1: A complete diagnostic cycle 
Lusted [1959] described a method of implementing the 
full diagnostic cycle. 
We argue that diagnostic reasoning must take into ac­
count the complete cycle, and should consider utility 
maximisation. In using a utility-based approach, the 
definition of a diagnosis is strongly influenced by how 
the diagnosis is to be used. 
There are a number of possible uses of a diagnosis, 
including: 
1. to find out the thing (or things) that is wrong; that 
is, through testing, to determine the exact state of 
the world with respect to the symptoms observed; 
2. to give a plausible account (an explanation) for the 
symptoms; that is, to give a description of what is 
wrong that is understandable to people; 
3. to enable a decision as to how to fix something; that 
is, to maximise the utility derived from the diagnos­
tic process through the treatment of the abnormal­
ities; 
4. to fix the symptoms; in some cases we may be happy 
to fix the symptoms without caring about what is 
really wrong. 
The first of these may be carried out by someone who 
is trying to determine what errors occur so that they can 
be prevented (for example, by redesigning some compo­
nents). The second and the third are both activities 
that an ideal doctor must undertake. As well as giving 
optimal treatment they also have to be able to give a ra­
tionale for the treatment. The fourth may be something 
that has to be done in an emergency, for example reduc­
ing the temperature of a patient with fever, or restoring 
power in a failed power station. 
While each of these may seem reasonable, we will see 
that different goals will lead to different evaluation cri­
teria. For example, the best decision may involve av­
eraging over many cases, which may not be conducive 
to a good explanation. Also there may be no point in 
finding the exact causes for a problem if further refine­
ment of the problem will not improve the outcome. In 
computing explanations, the most coherent explanation 
may not contain all the evidence or hypotheses. 
It is important to keep these different goals in mind 
when considering different proposals. 
3 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS 
3.1 Most likely single-fault hypothesis 
In this approach, the hypotheses considered are the 
unit hypotheses, h1, ... , hm. A single-fault diagnosis is 
defined as a conjunction of hypotheses, only one of 
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which is true. Hence, if hypothesis hi is the proposed 
single-fault hypothesis, the single-fault diagnosis Hi is 
7ii 1\ 7i2 1\ • · • 1\ hi 1\ · · · 1\ h,;; = hi 1\ 1\i ¢i 7ij. For example, 
if an electrical circuit contains m components, a single­
fault diagnosis is that component i is faulty and all other 
components are functioning normally. The most likely 
diagnosis is defined as the diagnosis with the highest 
probability, p(HiiE), over the set i E {1, ... , m}. 
3.2 Most likely posterior hypothesis 
As in the single-fault approach, the hypotheses consid­
ered are the unit hypotheses, h1, ... , hm. The most likely 
diagnosis is defined as the hypothesis with the highest 
posterior probability p(hi IE). 
This is the approach taken in MEDAS [Ben-Bassat 
et al., 1980], INTERNIST [Pople, 1982], and by 
Pearl [1986], for example. Pearl frames his analysis 
within Bayesian networks. This entails defining a causal 
graph of the problem, where the nodes represent random 
variables (or propositions) and directed edges represent 
direct causal influences between random variables. 
3.3 Most likely interpretation 
This approach entails considering the set I = { h, ... , Ik} 
of interpretations, the set of truth assignments for the 
propositions in H. The interpretation which is most 
likely given the evidence must be determined. Pearl 
[1987] defines this optimal interpretation as the interpre­
tation which has the highest posterior probability given 
the evidence, p(IdE), where there is no Ij such that 
p(IdE) < p(Ij IE). Reiter and Mackworth [1990] ad­
vocate considering all visual interpretations for a given 
image formalised as a set of logical clauses. Note that 
all interpretations need not be computed in order to find 
the most likely one [Pearl, 1987]. 
3.4 Probability of provability 
In this case we use a logical axiomatisation of the prob­
lem, as well as a probabilistic model of the domain. 
The logical model is used to prove the logical possibili­
ties of the observations 0 (which constitute the set of 
hypotheses in which one is interested), and then the 
probabilistic model is used to compute the likelihood 
of these. This corresponds to finding the most likely 
consistency-based diagnosis [Reiter, 1987, Poole, 1989b, 
de Kleer et al., 1990]. 
In terms of normal and abnormal function of system 
components, a consistency-based diagnosis is defined as: 
Definition 3.1 (Consistency-Based Diagnosis) 
A consistency-based diagnosis is a minimal set of 
abnormalities such that the observations are consistent 
with all other components acting normally [Reiter, 1987]. 
This approach entails axiomatising the problem as a 
logical theory 7 which consists of a set E of clauses rep­
resenting 0 and F. From E a set r of clauses logically 
entailed by E can be derived. This set can be defined as 
a minimal disjunct of maximal conjuncts of elements of 
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H that follow from E, 1 i.e. 
0 1\F �(hi 1\ ... 1\hj )V (h�; 1\ ... l\h1) V ... V (hm 1\ ... 1\hn)• 
Each conjunct is defined to be a diagnosis. 
In order to compute the probabilities of the elements 
of r, a probability distribution (or some other measure) 
must be assigned to E. Then the measure assigned to 
the 'Yi E r must be computed. 
One method of such a computation is provided by the 
ATMS, as described in [de Kleer and Williams, 1987] or 
[Provan, 1990, Laskey and Lehner, 1990].2 An assump­
tion can be assigned to each clause Ei E E to symboli­
cally represent the measure assigned to Ei. The ATMS 
then computes the set of assumptions assigned to each 
literal consistent with E. Consequently, the assumption 
set associated with each 'Yi can be computed. Assigning 
a measure to each assumption enables the measure for 
each 'Yi to be derived. 
The causal relationship in this approach has been de­
scribed by Pearl [1988] as evidential, as the direction of 
causality proceeds from evidence to cause. 
3.5 Covering explanations 
In this case the goal is to abduce a causal explanation of 
the observations. 
Definition 3.2 (Abductive Diagnosis) Given a 
causal axiomatisation of the system, an abductive di­
agnosis is a minimal set of hypotheses which, together 
with the background knowledge implies the observations 
0 [Poole et al., 1987, Poole, 1989a]. 
As in the provability approach, a logical axiomatisation 
is required. More formally, the hypotheses considered 
are the minimal conjunct of elements of H that imply 0 
from F (cf. [Poole, 1987]): 
F 1\ ((hi 1\ ... 1\hi )V(hk 1\ ... 1\h,)V ... V (hm 1\ ... 1\hn)) � 0. 
Each conjunct is an explanation or diagnosis. 
Abduction is used to compute a causal explanation for 
the observations. Note that the background knowledge 
F must be axiomatised differently in this approach and 
the previous one [Poole, 1988, Poole, 1989aj. 
Another method of describing this approach using 
graph theory is that of a. causal bipartite graph [Reg­
gia et al., 1985]. In such a. graph the bipartite edge sets 
consist of cause nodes and observation nodes, with di­
rected edges from cause nodes to observation nodes. A 
node covering of causes for a given set of observation 
nodes is required. 
A probabilistic analysis of this approach can be found 
in [Peng and Reggia, 1987a, Peng and Reggia, 1987b] and 
in [Neufeld and Poole, 1987]. Peng and Reggia [1987b] 
and Neufeld and Poole [1987] describe a method of com­
puting the best diagnoses by evaluating the best partial 
diagnoses only. 
1See, for example, [Reiter, 1987], [de Kleer and Williams, 
1987] or [de Kleer et al., 1990] for details. 
2For the purposes of this paper it is irrelevant what type of 
measure or combination function is used. What is of interest 
here is the measure assigned to r, and what is contained in 
r. 
Pearl [Pearl, 1988] describes this u a causal approach, 
as the direction of causality proceeds from cause to evi­
dence. 
3.6 Utility-hued explanation 
This approach computes not the most probable conjunc­
tion of hypotheses (or diagnosis), but the conjunction of 
hypotheses that are most useful for the treatment phase 
of diagnosis. 
To compute utilities, we can use the definition of a 
Bayesian network (as done in the first two approaches 
described in the paper) augmented with a set of deci­
sion nodes, a value node and utility values (an influence 
diagram [Shachter, 1986]). 
This approach makes no commitment as to which set 
of hypotheses constitute a diagnosis, unlike the logic­
based approaches (approaches 3 and 4). Bayesian net­
works can also be used to compute the probability of 
any conjunction of hypotheses, by creating a new node 
that represents the conjunction of the hypotheses of the 
nodes it is influenced by. 
Dependent on the utilities of a given problem instance, 
different combinations of hypotheses will be considered. 
In general, utility can be assigned on a problem by prob­
lem basis. Obviously, dependent on the utility func­
tion chosen, this approach can end up computing differ­
ent combinations of hypotheses than for the "diagnosis" 
from the first five approaches. 
The utility-based approach is influenced by work in 
computer vision, planning and in cognitive science in 
which a high-level description of the task influences both 
the objective function to be evaluated and the method 
of solving the task. For example, in computer vision, 
model-based object recognition systems use a descrip­
tion of the object to speed recognition of the object by 
looking for only image primitives which will most likely 
constitute a part of the object [Chin and Dyer, 1986]. 
We argue that the problem representation must be de­
pendent on the nature of the diagnosis required. Thus, 
if distinguishing among diagnoses does not affect the de­
cision made, there is no point to computing the different 
diagnoses, or an optimal diagnosis. Or, if the utility 
value is indifferent to particular liver diseases or heart 
diseases, the problem can be reformulated (e.g. all liver 
diseases considered as a "group", and all heart diseases 
considered as another "group"). 
As another example, consider a computer which has 
four main circuit boards, each of which can be divided 
into groups of components. If the computer goes down 
due to hardware failure, then the optimal diagnosis for 
a situation in which the computer must be fixed as soon 
as possible is to identify which circuit boards need to 
be replaced. If there is no time pressure, the optimal 
diagnosis may be to identify which group of components, 
or which specific components, must be replaced, given 
the high cost of replacing entire boards. 
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a 
c 
b 
d 
Figure 2: A circuit 
4 ARE THEY REALLY ALL THE 
SAME? 
In this section we demonstrate that the approaches do 
indeed give different answers. 
Example 4.1 Consider the analogue circuit of figure 2. 
In this figure a, b, c and d are gates that are faulty if 
they are closed (i.e., they are supposed to be open, but 
they can be shorted). Let A be the proposition that is 
true if a is shorted, and B be the proposition that is true 
if b is shorted, etc. 
Suppose we have the knowledge that the gates break 
independently and we have the priors 
p(A) = 0.016 
p(B) = 0.1 
p(C) = 0.15 
p(D) = 0.1 
Suppose we observe that there is a current flowing 
through the circuit. Let E be the proposition that rep­
resents this evidence. The diagnoses computed by each 
of the approaches are now examined. We first give the 
interpretations as the the probabilities of all interpreta­
tions serves as a generator for all the probabilities. 
The 16 possible interpretations are: 
Po= p(A" B A c" DIE) = 0.0006 
Pt = p(A ABACA -.DIE) = 0.0055 
P2= p(A" B A ...,c" DIE) = 0.0035 
Ps= p(A A B A ...,c A ..,DIE) = 0.0313 
P4 = p(A" ...,B "c A DIE) = 0.0065 
P& = p(A A ...,B A C A -.DIE) = 0.0497 
P6 = p(A" ...,B" ...,c" DIE) = 0.0313 
P7= p(A A ...,B A ...,C A -.DIE) = 0.2816 
Ps= p(...,A A B A.C A DIE) = 0.0377 
pg = p(-.A ABACA -,DIE) = 0.3395 
PlO = p( -.A A B A -.C A DIE) = 0.2138 
Pu = p(...,A ABA ...,C A ..,DIE) = 0.0 
P12 = p( -.A" ...,B " c" DIE) = 0.0 
Pts = p( -.A A ...,B A C A -.DIE) = 0.0 
P14 = p�...,A" ...,B A ...,c" DIE) = 0.0 
Pl& = p ..,A A -.B A ...,c A ..,DIE) = 0.0 
There are a few things to notice about the probabilities 
of the interpretations: 
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1. All of the other posterior probabilities can be gen­
erated from the Pi· In particular, for any formula w 
we have 
p(wiE) = p(IIE) 
{I:w is true in I} 
2. All of the interpretations that are not possible have 
probability zero. The last 5 interpretations are not 
possible given the circuit, and so must have proba­
bility zero. Note that there was no need to do any 
logical pruning before the probability phase. The 
logical axiomatisation of the provability and cover­
ing cases ( 4 and 5) was not to remove impossible in­
terpretations (as in [Ledley and Lusted, 1959]) but 
to determine what it is that we are getting the prob­
ability of. 
Single-fault. The possible single-fault diagnoses are 
obtained by saying that all of the interpretations 
except P7, Pu, P1s and P14 are impossible. There is 
only one possible single fault diagnosis: a is shorted. 
This does not depend on any prior probabilities, ex­
cept for the knowledge that the probability is zero 
for all of the impossible diagnoses. 
Posterior. When computing the most likely posterior, 
we compare 
p(AIE) = Po+ Pl + P2 + Ps + P4 + P5 + P6 + P1 
p(BjE) Po+ Pl + P2 + Ps + Ps + P9 + Plo + Pll 
P( CjE) = Po + Pl + P4 + Ps + Ps + P9 + P12 + P1s 
p(DIE) Po + P2 + P4 + P6 + Ps + P1o + P12 + Pl4 
Numerically, the posterior probabilities are: 
p(AjE) = 0. 409 
p(BjE) = 0.632 
p( CIE) = 0.439 
p(DIE) = 0.292 
The most likely faulty component is b. 
Interpretation. The highest probability is P9, which 
indicates that the most likely interpretation is that 
b and c are shorted, and a and d are not shorted.3 
Provability. In the fourth case we need to axiomatise 
the circuit: 
E�AV(BA(CVD)), 
and find the probabilities of the resulting diagnoses: 
p(AIE) = Po + Pl + P2 + Ps + P4 + P5 
+P6 + P1 
p(B 1\ CjE) = Po+ Pl + Ps + Ps 
p(B A DIE) = Po+ P2 + Ps + Plo· 
3Note that this diagnosis just coincidentally corresponds 
to the most likely posterior hypothesis (in that they both 
have b broken). If we changed the priors slightly to make 
p(C) = 0.12, the most likely interpretation becomes the one 
with just A true, but the most likely posterior hypothesis is 
unchanged. 
Numerically, the probabilities are: 
p(AjE) = 0.409 
p(B A OlE) = 0.383 
p(B 1\ DjE) = 0. 256. 
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The most likely diagnosis is that a is shorted. 
Covering. For the covering hypothesis case we also 
need a logical axiomatisation, such as 
A�E 
BI\C�E 
BI\D�E 
When E is observed, we get the same comparisons 
as the previous case, and the same most likely diag­
nosis. 
Utility-based. The final case is where we have to take 
utilities into account. The next three examples show 
how this can interact with the diagnoses. 
Example 4.2 Suppose that we can fix up the gates of 
example 4.1 independently. In this case the only relevant 
probabilities are the posteriors of each of the hypotheses. 
We denote by F:: the treatment of fixing gate x. Con­
sider the following utility values: 
{ +$1 ifF:: E r 1\ XED:: 
u(E, D::, r) = -$1 ifF:: E r 1\ X ¢ D:: 
0 otherwise 
In this case, since p(BIE) is greater than 0. 5, we ex­
pect to gain from fixing gate b, but do not gain from 
fixing any of the other gates. Thus it is only worthwhile 
fixing gate b. 
If one believes that the aim of the diagnosis is to fix 
all of the problems, then this is a peculiar thing to do. 
Based on the logical analysis, it cannot be the case that 
only b is shorted. 
Example 4.3 Suppose there is a heavy penalty for not 
fixing the circuit by replacing a particular gate, as shown 
in the following utility function: 
{ +$1 if F:: E r 1\ X E D:: 
-$1 ifF:: E r /\X¢ D:: u(E, D::, TD,.) = -$10 ifF:: ¢ r 1\ XED:: 
0 if F#) rf. r 1\ X rf. D:: 
In this case, all gates will be replaced in our example. 
All we needed to compute was the posterior probabilities 
for the individual hypotheses. 
Example 4.4 Suppose we can fix up gates b and c in­
dependently, but that the ways to fix up gates a and 
d interact in a complex way. In this case the relevant 
probabilities are 
p(AjE) = 0.409 
p(BjE) = 0. 632 
p(CIE) = 0.439 
p(A 1\ DIE) = 0. 041 
p(AA-,DjE) = 0.368 
p(...,AADIE) = 0.251 
p(-,A A -,DIE) = 0.340 
which is not what any of the diagnOiiell computed. Note 
that in this case the probabilities that are needed are 
not determined by what can explain the observations, 
but rather what is needed for the treatment. 
It might coincidentally happen that two approaches 
compute the best qualitative diagnosis, but this is not 
true in general. It is, however, not coincidence that the 
provability and covering approaches produce the same 
answer. It can be shown that, under certain reasonable 
assumptions about how the knowledge is represented, 
the propositional versions of the abductive and the de­
ductive systems [Poole, 1988] are identical. This is not, 
however, necessarily true for the non-propositional ver­
sions. The difference arises because of the level of detail 
of the diagnoses. The more specific the diagnoses, the 
less likely it is. The abductive systems require the level of 
detail specific enough to imply the observations. In the 
deductive system, the level of detail is prescribed, not 
by the observation, but by the knowledge base [Poole, 
1989a]. 
5 ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS 
Each of the proposals has good and bad points, some of 
which are now discussed. 
5.1 Single-fault Diagnosis 
The main problem with the most likely single fault hy­
pothesis is that it may be wrong. The real diagnosis may 
be a combination of faults. 
Another problem is that the single fault definition de­
pends on the representation used. At one level of ab­
straction a single fault may be a very complicated com­
bination of faults at another level of detail. For example, 
at one level of abstraction a problem may be that one 
power supply is broken. At another level of detail there 
may be a number of pwblerns with the one power supply. 
5.2 Most Likely Posterior 
There are a number of problems with the "most likely 
posterior hypothesis" approach: 
1. It is the weakest statement about the world. Thus, 
if a pigeon is a type of bird, one must have 
p(pigeoniE) $ p(birdiE). 
2. High (possibly irrelevant) priors may dominate the 
relevant hypotheses. 
3. Groups of hypotheses are not considered. This ap­
proach cannot compute diagnoses which consist of 
sets of hypotheses. Multiple-hypothesis diagnoses 
can be determined by heuristics only (e.g. as is done 
in INTERNIST [Pople, 1982]). In contrast, the in­
terpretation, consistency and covering methods can 
compute multiple-hypothesis diagnoses based on the 
underlying theory of the method. Note that this 
does not imply we cannot diagnose systems with 
multiple faults, but rather that we do not consider 
conjunctions in diagnoses. 
Note that we can add hypotheses which are con­
junctions of hypotheses, but these will always be 
less likely that the original hypotheses. 
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5.3 Most Likely Interpretation 
In the most likely interpretation approach (# 3) there 
can be an exponential number of interpretations, and so 
for any reasonable sized problem we do not want to de­
rive all interpretations (as in [Reiter and Mackworth, 
1990]). Many interpretations will be highly unlikely, 
and computing them will be a waste of computational 
resources. However, it is not necessary to enumerate 
all interpretations [Pearl, 1987, de Kleer and Williams, 
1989]4• 
Another drawback of this approach is that the most 
likely interpretation does not let us be agnostic about 
any proposition; we have to give a truth value to every 
hypothesis, no matter how related to the observations. 
Changing the space of hypotheses can change the prob­
ability of the most likely composite, and even what the 
most likely composite is [Pearl, 1988, p.285). Even more 
importantly, for building large knowledge bases adding 
"irrelevant" hypotheses can also change the most likely 
interpretation. If we imagine a random variable that 
is probabilistica.lly independent of the other variables, 
then the most likely qualitative conjunct will remain the 
same: we will end up with the product of the most likely 
prior of the irrelevant hypothesis and the most likely in­
terpretation. If however the new random variable is not 
independent, then just by imagining different scenarios 
we can change the qualitative diagnosis, as the following 
example shows. 
Example 5.1 Consider a. patient who has symptoms 
which suggest either the flu or yellow fever, the flu be­
ing the more likely diagnosis. Now, suppose we add a 
variable that represents where the person was at some 
particular time two weeks previously. We partition the 
world so that the different places all have equal probabili­
ties (e.g., "Africa" may be one area, and "above the most 
northerly fioor tile in their office" may be another). If 
these new variables are independent of the disease vari­
able, the most likely interpretation will consist of the 
most likely values for each variable. Simply by assuming 
that it is much more likely that the patient has yellow 
fever if she was in Africa, the most likely composite hy­
pothesis may be that the patient has Yellow fever and 
was in Africa5• 
One other problem with finding the most likely in­
terpretation is that the most likely interpretation may 
have very low probability. Peng and Reggia [1987c] first 
pointed this out and suggested that rather than finding 
the most likely interpretation, we should find a set of 
interpretations that covers some percentage of all of the 
cases. 
�Note that the phase of removing interpretations inconsis­
tent with the knowledge (i.e., those interpretations that are 
not models of the logical constraints) is unnecessary because 
p(hi\E) = 0 if h; is inconsistent with evidence E. 
&This example is different from the example given by Pearl 
[1988, p. 285], in that we are adding a new hypothesis rather 
than changing a hypothesis. Just by imagining a new hy­
pothesis, and making no new observations, we can change 
the value of the most likely interpretation. 
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5.4 Covering Explanations 
Approaches 4 and 5 are discussed together because 
propositional versions of these approaches have been 
shown to produce the same results under certain assump­
tions [Poole, 1988]. These differ from the interpretation 
approach in enabling us to be agnostic about the value 
of some variables which are irrelevant to the goal. 
5.5 Consistency and Covering Approaches 
These logic-based approaches are limited to what is prov­
able within the logical theory T. Hence, they are sensi­
tive to the particular logical description. If an observa­
tion is not provable, then nothing can be said about it. 
(Similarly, for the Bayesian approach, if the appropri­
ate conditional probabilities are present for an observa­
tion, no �easure c�� be assigned to the observation.) In 
contrast, m the utility-based approach considered here 
what is computed depends on the goal of the diagnosis: 
Both the consistency and covering approaches rely on 
making assumptions about the system under examina­
tion. Pearl [1990] has shown that this approach has 
two major flaws: (1) independencies among events with 
unkn�wn probabilities cannot be represented; and (2) 
domam knowledge describing defeasible conditional sen­
tences cannot be represented. Thus, these approaches 
are limited to problems in which the domain knowledge 
can be defined in categorical terms, e. g. strict taxo­
nomic hierarchies, deterministic systems (electronic cir­
cuits but not medical diagnosis or default reasoning), etc. 
If these approaches are misapplied to certain domains 
non-intuitive results can be obtained. 
' 
. Pearl [1990] argues that instead of making assump­
tiOns about the hypotheses, examining the logical con­
sequenc;�s of these assumptions, and then assigning a 
probability measure over the assumptions a probability 
measure should be assigned over the logical clauses :E 
and the probabilities assigned to interpretations be ex­
a.mined (as .done in approach 2). If not all clauses are as­
�Igned a weight, then probability bounds (specifically the 
mner and outer measure) can be obtained for the mea­
sure assigned to the h�potheses. For example, Nilsson 
[1986] presents a techmque which can accept an incom­
plete pr�babilistic specification, and computes ranges for 
the reqmred measures for hypotheses. This paper argues 
that it is not clear that the approach suggested by Pearl 
(i.e. that the most likely interpretation must be evalu­
ated) is always the best one. 
However, because these logic-based approaches seem 
to be appealing for a number of reasons, it may be impor­
tant to determine subcases of non-categorical domains in 
which paradoxes do not arise. 
5.6 Utility-based diagnoses 
The utility-based approach assumes that utilities are 
domain-dependent, which implies that diagnoses must 
be domain-dependent as well. In contrast, the other 
approaches assume that the definition of diagnosis is 
domain-independent. In addition, preferences used to 
define best diagnoses cannot be assigned in a domain­
independent manner. Doyle and Wellman [1989] have 
proven that there exists no universally-valid preference 
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set; in other words, preferences are consistent only within 
particular domains. Furthermore, Doyle [1989j argues 
for a decision-theoretic, and not merely probabilistic 
definition of consistency and rationality in decision� 
making (and therefore diagnosis). 
T�e util.it!-based approa:h is considered the proper o�e m declSion theory and m several areas of cognitive 
science. For example, in visual recognition it has been 
shown. how several low-level (and quite primitive) pre­attentive processes are used to focus attention on the 
�ost salient features of a scene [Treisman, 1982], and 
simple features are used to guide scene interpretation 
[Rose�feld, 1987]. In some cases, results from these pre­
attentive processes are used directly to initiate action. 
For example, in the forest if a deer sees motion close by 
(the presence of motion in the visual field can be detected 
pre-attentively), it will start running without identifying 
the cause of the motion, as it might get eaten if it spent 
the time trying to identify the cause of the motion. If 
the deer is not in danger, motion can trigger a closer 
scrutiny for the cause of the motion. 
One of the problems of the utility-based approach is 
that there is nothing in a diagnosis unless there is a goal 
and utilities. There is no ''value free" definition of a 
diagnosis. Whether this is desirable or not is left up to 
t�e reader. There is also the problem of being able to 
g1ve someone an understandable explanation to answer 
the question "what is wrong?". 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has analysed several definitions of what a 
dia�n�sis, an� so, presumably, what a most-likely diag­
?osis Is, showmg them to be mutually incompatible. It 
IS not clear that one definition is correct over all domains 
and situations, and for all possible uses that there could 
be for the diagnosis. Instead, we argue that the notion 
of most likely diagnosis cannot be defined a priori, but is 
defined based on what the diagnosis is to be used for and 
o.n the uitlity of the outcomes of treating the abnor:Oali­ties. In other words, there may be no a priori ontological 
definition of optimal diagnosis; it is epistemological and 
situation-dependent. 
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